Dear Equilibrium community,
This is a second proposal in response to the Multichain hack damage control. Previously we <a href="../referendum/2">disabled</a> the mxUSDC-EQD stable swap pool so liquidity providers (LPT1 token holders) can only redeem EQD and mxUSDC tokens in balanced proportion to wind down their pool positions. See this referendum for detail. This proposal aims to do the following:
<ul>
<li>set code to update the pricing of the LP tokens to account for relative volumes inside the pool (calculate VWAP price instead of simple average price)</li>
<li>set a price of mxUSDC inside the Equilibrium oracle to be equal to zero. mxUSDC wrappers have no collateral in the form of Ethereum native USDC to support them, so effectively they should be valued at zero.</li>
</ul>
Implications:
<ol>
<li>All mxUSDC collateral both with bailsmen and borrowers will be valued at $0.</li>
<li>All LPT1 tokens (LP tokens of the mxUSDC-EQD stable swap pool), will be valued at roughly 67% of their initial value.</li>
<li>Some of the borrowers and bailsmen holding LPT1 tokens as collateral may become subject to maintenance margin calls and should act on their positions accordingly.</li>
</ol>
Expectations:
We expect LPT1 token holders to wind down their positions in the stable swap pool and repay their EQD debt.
Further steps:
We will assess how quickly the pool winds down and if not quickly enough we will propose to wind down the pool and repay the debt automatically via the runtime upgrade. follow the governance and our social media announcements.

Send a batch of dispatch calls.

May be called from any origin.

- `calls`: The calls to be dispatched from the same origin. The number of call must not
 exceed the constant: `batched_calls_limit` (available in constant metadata).

If origin is root then call are dispatch without checking origin filter. (This includes
bypassing `frame_system::Config::BaseCallFilter`).

# <weight>
- Complexity: O(C) where C is the number of calls to be batched.
# </weight>

This will return `Ok` in all circumstances. To determine the success of the batch, an
event is deposited. If a call failed and the batch was interrupted, then the
`BatchInterrupted` event is deposited, along with the number of successful calls made
and the error of the failed call. If all were successful, then the `BatchCompleted`
event is deposited.

- There is a proposal to update the pricing of LP tokens in the pool.
- The price of mxUSDC will be set to zero.
- This will affect the value of mxUSDC collateral and LPT1 tokens.
- Some people may need to repay their debt or face margin calls.
- The pool may be winded down if needed.

#4 mxUSDC discontinuation and oracle Fix proposal in response to Multichain bridge hack

No Active Proposals