Dear Equilibrium community, 

The recent #Multichain bridge [exploit](https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/multichain-exploit-july-2023/) affects Equilibrium's mxUSDC wrapper asset (`assetId:120364133999715`). Equilibrium bridges USDC asset into parachain via Multichain bridge router through Moonbeam EVM - XCM connection and Moonbeam native XC-20 token-wrappers. Since the original ERC-20 USDC in Ethereum was moved out of Multichain bridge contracts, mxUSDC on Equilibrium represents a certain risk. 

This proposal aims to mitigate this risk spreading across the Equilibrium network. Given the high percentage of mxUSDC tokens located inside the stableswap `poolID = 1` we propose to disable the corresponding pool by setting the flag `isEnabled = False` on-chain. Disabling the pool will disallow deposits and trades inside the pool and will only allow for `RemoveLiquidity` extrinsic to be called.

The on-chain `poolID = 1` stats as of parachain block number 2973512 are following:

```jsx
{
  owner: cg44ZXV6nyj9ndnQwLzqqLHRXTDhk5MD3tEdUPPhLLiCYJxou
  poolAsset: 1,819,309,105
  assets: [
    6,648,164
    120,364,133,999,715
  ]
  amplification: 10,000,000,000,000,000
  fee: 0.06%
  adminFee: 66.66%
  balances: [
    428,047,274,579,325
    209,902,746,732,045
  ]
  totalBalances: [
    428,057,318,148,894
    209,912,024,787,796
  ]
  isEnabled: true
}
```

- There was a problem with a bridge called Multichain that affected Equilibrium's mxUSDC asset.
- They want to reduce the risk by disabling a pool called `poolID = 1`.
- Disabling the pool means people can't put money in or trade there, but they can take money out.
- The pool has a lot of mxUSDC tokens in it.
- They are trying to keep the Equilibrium network safe.

#2 EQD-mxUSDC pool handling in response to Multichain bridge hack

No Active Proposals